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1 Introduction
An account of utterance interpretation in discourse needs to face the
issue of how the discourse context controls the space of interacting
preferences. Assuming a discourse processing architecture that distin-
guishes the grammar and pragmatics subsystems in terms of monotonic
and nonmonotonic inferences, I will discuss how independently moti-
vated default preferences interact in the interpretation of intersentential
pronominal anaphora.
In the framework of a general discourse processing model that inte-
grates both the grammar and pragmatics subsystems, I will propose a
fine structure of the preferential interpretation in pragmatics in terms
of defeasible rule interactions. The pronoun interpretation preferences
that serve as the empirical ground draw from the survey data specifi-
cally obtained for the present purpose.
∗I would like to thank David Beaver, Johan van Benthem, Paul Dekker, Jan van
Eijck, Jan Jaspars, Aravind Joshi, Alex Lascarides, Daniel Marcu, Becky Passon-
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from the seminar participants at the University of Bielefeld and the University of
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pretation questionnaire whose results are discussed herein. Part of the work was
sponsored by project NF 102/62–356 (‘Structural and Semantic Parallels in Natural
Languages and Programming Languages’), funded by the Netherlands Organization
for the Advancement of Research (N.W.O.).
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2 Discourse Processing Architecture
I will assume in this paper that a discourse is a sequence of utterances
produced (spoken or written) by one or more discourse participants.
Utterances are tokens of sentences or sentence fragments with which
the speakers communicate certain information, and it is done in a con-
text. Utterance interpretation depends on the context, and utterance
meaning updates the context.
A specification of the complex interdependencies involved in utter-
ance interpretation is greatly facilitated if it is couched in a discourse
processing architecture that is both logically coherent and as closely
as possible an approximation of the human cognitive architecture for
discourse processing. What are the major modules of the architecture,
and what types of inferences do they support? I claim that the most
fundamental separation is between the spaces of possibilities and pref-
erences.
2.1 Separating Combinatorics and Preferences
There is an assumption in computational linguistics that combinatorics
should take precedence over preferences. The wisdom is to maximize
the combinatoric space of utterance interpretation and to keep a firm
line between this space and the other, preferential, space of interpreta-
tion. Preferences are affected by computationally expensive open-ended
commonsense inferences. Combinatorics determine all and only possi-
ble interpretations, and preferences prioritize the possibilities.1 Seen
from another point of view, combinatorics are indefeasible — that is,
never overridden by commonsense plausibility, whereas preferences are
defeasible — that is, can be overridden by commonsense plausibility.
I will henceforth assume that the grammar subsystem consists only of
indefeasible possibilities, hence monotonic, whereas the pragmatics sub-
system consists mostly (or possibly entirely) of defeasible preferences,
hence nonmonotonic.2
1This separation of rule types does not imply a sequential ordering between the
two processing modules. Different rule types can be interleaved for interpreting or
generating a subsentential constituent.
2The same formal system can be viewed from different viewpoints — as a system
of rules, constraints, or inferences. Rules produce and transform structures in a sys-
tem, constraints reduce possible structures, and inferences are used to reason about
structures (e.g., manipulating assertions or drawing conclusions) as the “logic” in
the standard sense. To take a prominent example, in the “parsing as deduction”
paradigm (Pereira and Warren, 1980), context-free rules are also seen as deductive
inference rules. The rule S →NP VP is translated into the inference rule NP(i,j)
∧ VP(j,k) → S(i,k). I will not adhere to one particular viewpoint in this paper,
and rather take advantage of the flexibility.
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An example of indefeasible rules of grammar in English is the
Subject-Verb-Object constituent order. The sentence Coffee drinks
Sally uttered in a normal intonation cannot mean “Sally drinks cof-
fee” despite the commonsense support. An example of defeasible pref-
erences is the interpretation of the pronoun he in discourse “John hit
Bill. He was severely injured.” The combinatoric rule of pronoun in-
terpretation would say that both John and Bill are possible referents
of he, while the preferential rule would say that Bill is preferred here
because it is more plausible that the one who is hit gets injured rather
than vice versa. Crucially, this preference is overridden in certain con-
texts. For instance, if Bill is an indestructible cyborg, the preferred
semantic value of he would shift to John.
The inferential properties of the grammar subsystem as a space
of possibilities are well–illustrated in the so-called unification–based
grammatical formalisms (UBG). A UBG system consists of context-free
phrase structure constraints and unification constraints. Maxwell and
Kaplan (1993) describe how the constraint interactions can be made
efficient by exploiting the following properties of a UBG system: (1)
monotonicity — no deduction is ever retracted when new constraints
are added, (2) independence— no new constraints can be deduced when
two systems are conjoined, (3) conciseness — the size of the system is
a polynomial function of the input that it was derived from, and (4)
order invariance — sets of constraints can be processed in any order
without changing the final result.3
The inferential properties of the pragmatics subsystem are much less
understood. Its general features can be characterized as those of pref-
erential reasoning, a topic more studied in AI than in linguistics. The
pragmatics subsystem contains sets of preference rules that, in certain
combinations, could lead to conflicting preferences. This fundamental
indeterminacy leads to the properties opposite from those of the gram-
mar subsystem: (1) nonmonotonicity — preferences can be canceled
when overriding preferences are added, (2) dependence — new prefer-
ences may result when two pragmatic subsystems are conjoined, (3)
explosion — the system size is possibly an exponential (or worse) func-
tion of the input that it was derived from, and (4) order variance —
changing the order in which sets of preferences are processed may also
change the final result. The key to a discourse processing architecture is
to preserve the above computational properties of the grammar subsys-
tem while striving for a maximal control of the preference interactions
3Grammar rules can be seen from two viewpoints — they eliminate as well as
create possibilities. The former applies when communication is seen as incremental
elimination of possible information states. The latter applies when it is seen as
incremental increase of information content. I leave the choice open here.
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in the pragmatics subsystem.4
Existing logical semantic theories employing dynamic interpretation
rules (e.g., Kamp, 1981; Heim, 1982; Groenendijk and Stokhof, 1991;
Kamp and Reyle, 1993) formalize the basic context dependence of in-
defeasible semantics. While these theories predict the possible dynamic
interpretations of utterances, they are not concerned with how to com-
pute the relative preferences among them. Lascarides and Asher (1993)
extend the Discourse Representation Theory (DRT) (Kamp, 1981) with
the interaction of defeasible rules for integrating a new utterance con-
tent into the discourse information state. The input to their defeasi-
ble reasoning is a fully interpreted DR Structure (DRS), with all the
NPs already interpreted. The pragmatics subsystem I am concerned
with here also includes the defeasible rules for NP interpretation and
constituent attachments needed for DRS construction. The input to
pragmatics in the present proposal is a much less specified logical form,
and pragmatics kicks in during DRS construction.
2.2 The Processing Architecture
The discourse processing architecture that I will assume in the back-
ground of the remainder of this paper is this.5
• Let discourse be a sequence of utterances, utt1, . . . , uttn. We
say that utterance utti defines a transition relation between the
input context Ci−1 and the output context Ci. Context C is a
multicomponent data structure (see section 2.3). The transition
takes place as follows:
• Let grammar G consist of rules of syntax and semantics
that assign each utterance utti the initial logical form Φi.
• Φi represents a disjunctive set of underspecified formu-
las containing unresolved references, unscoped quantifiers,
and vague relations. Φi is the weakest formula that pack-
ages a family of formulas that covers the entire range of
4In contrast, the abduction–based system (Hobbs et al., 1993) does not separate
grammar and pragmatics. All the rules are defeasible and directly interact in one big
module. (The defeasibility of grammar rules is motivated by the fact of disfluencies
in language use.) The result is an increased computational complexity.
5This architecture is in line with Stalnaker’s (1972:385) conception:
The syntactical and semantical rules for a language determine an in-
terpreted sentence or clause; this, together with some features of the
context of use of the sentence or clause, determines a truth value. An
interpreted sentence, then, corresponds to a function from contexts
into propositions, and a proposition is a function from possible worlds
into truth values.
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possible interpretations of utti (see section 3).
• Let pragmatics P consist of rules for specifying and dis-
ambiguating Φi in context Ci−1. Ideally, P outputs the
single preferred interpretation φki (φ
k
i is subsumed by Φi
and there is no φji that is preferred over φ
k
i and also sub-
sumed by Φi), and integrating φ
k
i into context Ci−1 pro-
duces the preferred output context Ci. In a less felicitous
case, the rules of P do not converge, resulting in multiple
interpretations and output contexts.
2.3 Context
My aim here is to introduce the basic components of the context C
in the above discourse processing architecture that I assume in the
remainder of the paper.
Context Ci is a 6-tuple 〈φ
k
i , Di, Ai, Ii, L,K〉 consisting of the fast-
changing components, 〈φki , Di, Ai, Ii〉, significantly affected by the dy-
namic import of utterances and the slow-changing components,〈L,K〉,
relatively stable in a given stretch of discourse instance. φki is the pre-
ferred interpretation (see section 2.2) of the last utterance utti in a
logical form that preserves aspects of the syntactic structure of utti
— best thought of as a short-term register of the surface structure of
the previous utterance similar to the proposal by Sag and Hankamer
(1984). Di is the discourse model — a set of information states that
the discourse has been about, which also incorporates the content of
φki . Di contains sets of situations, eventualities, entities, and relations
among them, associated with the evolving event, temporal, and dis-
course structures. Ai is the attentional state — a partial order of the
entities and propositions in Di, where the ordering is by salience. Ai
is separated from Di because the same Di may correspond to different
variants of Ai depending on the particular sequence of utterances in
particular forms describing the same set of facts. Ii is the set of indexi-
cal anchors— the indexically accessible objects in the current discourse
situation — for instance, the values of indexical expressions such as I,
you, here, and now. The slow-changing components are the linguistic
knowledge L and world knowledge K used by the discourse participants.
Although we know that discourse participants never share exactly the
same mental state representing these components of the context, there
must be a significant overlap in order for a discourse to be mutually
intelligible. For the purpose of this paper, I will simply assume that
context C is sufficiently shared by the participants.
The next section elaborates on the initial logical form Φi that plays
a crucial role of defining the grammar–pragmatics boundary in the
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discourse processing architecture.
3 Indefeasible Semantics
The initial logical form (ILF) Φ represents the utterance’s structure and
meaning at the grammar–pragmatics boundary. This section discusses
the general features of ILF with examples.
3.1 General Considerations
There are specific proposals for the ILF Φ in the computational liter-
ature (e.g., Alshawi and van Eijck, 1989; Alshawi, 1992; Alshawi and
Crouch, 1992; Hwang and Schubert, 1992a, 1992b; Pereira and Pol-
lack, 1991). Details in these proposals vary, but there is a remarkable
agreement on the general features.
The ILF Φ contains “vague” predicates and functions representing
what the utterance communicates. Vague predicates and functions rep-
resent various expression and construction types whose interpretation
depends on the discourse context. They include unresolved referring
expressions such as the pronoun he, unscoped quantifiers such as each,
vague relations such as the relation between the nouns in a noun–noun
compound, unresolved operators such as the tense operator past and
the mood operator imperative, and attachment ambiguities such as for
PP–attachments. The idea can also be extended to underspecify lex-
ical senses at the ILF level. These predicates and functions generate
‘assumptions’ that need to be resolved or ‘discharged’ in the union of
the discourse and sentence contexts. The ILF is thus partial and inde-
feasible — partial because it does not always have a truth value, and
indefeasible because further contextual interpretations only prioritize
possibilities and specify vagueness.
The ILF Φ also represents aspects of the utterance’s surface struc-
ture relevant to how the utterance communicates the information con-
tent (e.g., the Topic–Focus Articulation of Sgall et al., 1986). Such a
syntax–semantics corepresentation could be achieved in either of the
two options: (1) the logical form is structured, representing aspects of
phonological and surface syntactic structures such as the grammati-
cal functions of nominal expressions, linear order, and topic–comment
structure, or (2) the partial semantic representation and the phonolog-
ical and syntactic structures are separately represented with mappings
among corresponding parts. In this paper, the choice is arbitrary as
long as certain syntactic information is available at the logical form.
There is a general question of how far and how soon the ILF gets
specified and disambiguated by the pragmatics. The above existing
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proposals in the computational literature assume that each utterance
is completely specified and disambiguated before the next utterance
comes in. This includes the integration of the utterance content into
the evolving discourse structure, event structure, and temporal struc-
ture in the context, as discussed by Lascarides and Asher (1993). An
utterance’s complete interpretation is not in general available on the
spot, however, and it often has to wait till some more information is
supplied in the subsequent discourse (Grosz et al., 1986). It is also
possible that only the information concerning those entities that are
significant or salient (or ‘in focus’) in the current discourse need to
be fully specified and disambiguated.6 The present discourse process-
ing architecture allows such incremental and partial specification and
disambiguation of the information state along discourse progression
though this perspective is not explored in any technical detail here.
In sum, the ILF represents the indefeasible semantics of an utter-
ance by leaving the following context–dependent interpretations under-
determined: reference of nominal expressions, modifier attachments,
quantifier scoping, vague relations, and lexical senses. The ILF also
leaves open how the given utterance is integrated into the temporal,
event, and discourse structures in the context.
3.2 Our Working Formalism
I will use a simplified ILF in this paper. It is an underspecified predicate
logic in a davidsonian style — a version of QLF (Kameyama, 1995)
without the aterm–qterm distinction. The ILF for the utterance “He
made a robot spider” is as follows:
decl (past[∃exy[make(e)∧AgentSubj(e, x)∧ pro(x) ∧ he(x)
∧ ThemeObj(e, y) ∧ indef sg(y) ∧ spider(y)
∧ nn relation(y, λz(robot, z))]])
It contains the following vague predicates and functions:
• unresolved unstressed pronoun “he” — pro(x) ∧ he(x)
• unscoped quantificational determiner “a” — indef sg(y)
• a vague relation for a noun-noun compound “robot spider”
— spider(y)∧ nn relation(y, λz(robot, z)) (a relation between a
spider entity and a robot property)
• unresolved past tense — past(ψ)
• unresolved declarative mood — decl(ψ′)
6A comment by Paul Dekker.
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If the preferred interpretation of the utterance is that “John” made a
robot shaped like a spider, we have the following DRS–like logical form:
∃etxy[make(e) ∧ T ime(e, t) ∧ AgentSubj(e, x)
∧ named(x, “john′′) ∧ ThemeObj(e, y) ∧ spider like(y) ∧
robot(y)]
The interpretation is complete when the content is integrated into the
discourse, event, and temporal structures in the context. These struc-
tures are assumed to be in the discourse model D. The pragmatics
subsystem must make all of the preferential decisions including NP
interpretation and operator interpretation as well as contextual inte-
gration.7
3.3 Ambiguity and Underspecification
The initial logical form mixes both ambiguity and underspecification.
The choice is largely arbitrary when the number of possible interpreta-
tions is exhaustively enumerable. Whenever there are n possible inter-
pretations for a linguistic item or construction type, we can have either
(1) a disjunctive set of n interpretations i1, ..., in, from which the prag-
matics chooses the best, or (2) one underspecified interpretation that
the pragmatics further specifies. Pragmatic disambiguation and speci-
fication involve exactly the same kind of an interplay of linguistic and
commonsense preferences, and relative preferences in disambiguation
and specification are often interdependent.
Consider He made a robot spider with six legs. There is a preference
for the interpretation “a robot spider with six legs” over the alternative
“a male person with six legs”. This preference is overridden in certain
contexts — for instance, if the person is a fictional figure who can freely
change the number of legs to be two, four, or six, the alternative reading
becomes equally plausible. Note that the attachment disambiguation
and pronoun interpretation are interdependent here.
When the number of possible interpretations cannot be exhaustively
enumerated, however, ambiguity and underspecification are not inter-
changeable, and we must posit an underspecified relation as a semantic
primitive. A sufficient but not necessary condition for positing an un-
derspecified relation is this (Kameyama, 1995):8
7I assume that various preferential decisions are interleaved rather than sequen-
tially ordered within pragmatics.
8We have here an operational criterion for separating out grammar and pragmat-
ics. It leads to a discovery of cross–linguistic variation in the grammar–pragmatics
boundary. Long–distance dependency is a case in point (Kameyama, 1995).
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An underspecified relation is posited when there is an open–
ended set of possible specific relations associated with a con-
struction type, and the interpretation is typically affected
by ad hoc facts known in the discourse context.
A canonical example is the interpretation of noun–noun compounds
such as elephant pen. It could mean a pen shaped like an elephant, a
pen with elephant pictures on the body, a pen with a small toy elephant
glued on the top, or, depending on the context, a pen that the speaker
found on the ground when she was pretending to be an elephant. All
we can tell from the grammar of noun-noun compounds is that it is a
pen that has some salient relation with elephants. It makes sense, then,
to explicitly state in the grammar output the vague notion of “some
salient relation” as a primitive. This is the basic motivation of the
proposal for underspecified relations in the logical form in the compu-
tational literature (e.g., Alshawi, 1990; Hobbs et al., 1993). The same
thing goes with scope ambiguities. The number of possible scopings
is always bounded but possibly very large (on the order of hundreds),
and speakers are often unable to select a single specific scoping, so the
grammar should defer assigning specific scopings to a sentence and give
it to pragmatics (Hobbs, 1983; Reyle, 1993; Poesio, 1993).
In sum, with the ILF sealing off the space of grammatical reason-
ing, the present discourse processing architecture magnifies the impor-
tance of pragmatics in utterance interpretation. Pragmatics achieves
anaphora resolution, attachment disambiguation, quantifier scoping,
vague relation specification, and contextual integration all in one mod-
ule. Is there a system in the chaos? That is the question we turn to
now.
4 Defeasible Pragmatics
This section discusses the features and examples of the defeasible rules
in the pragmatics subsystem.
4.1 General Considerations
By defeasible, I mean a conclusion that has to be retracted when some
additional facts are introduced. This characterizes the preferential as-
pect of utterance interpretation with the nonmonotonicity property.
Grammatical reasoning is governed by the Tarskian notion of valid in-
ference in standard logic — “Each model of the premises is also a model
for the conclusion.” Pragmatic reasoning distinguishes among models
as to their relevance or plausibility, and is governed by the notion of
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plausible inference (Shoham, 1988) — “Each most preferred model of
the premises is a model for the conclusion.” The preference can be
stated in terms of default rules as well, so the general reasoning takes
the form of “as long as no exception is known, prefer the default.” In
utterance interpretation, this form of reasoning chooses the best inter-
pretation from among the set of possible ones. The present focus is the
interpretation preferences of intersentential pronominal anaphora.
4.2 Earlier Computational Approaches to Pronoun
Interpretation
Computational research on pronoun interpretation has always recog-
nized the existence of powerful grammatical preferences, but there are
different views on their status in the overall processing architecture.
Hobbs (1978) discussed the relative merit of purely grammar–based
and purely commonsense–based strategies for pronoun interpretation.
His grammar–based strategy that accounts for 98% of a large number
of pronouns in naturally occurring texts simply could not be extended
to account for the remaining cases that only commonsense reasoning
can explain. He settled in a “deeper” method that seeks a global co-
herence arguing that coreference can be determined as a side–effect
of coherence–seeking interpretation. The abduction–based approach
(Hobbs et al., 1993) is an example of such a general inference system,
where syntax–based preferences for coreference resolution are used as
the last resort when other inferences do not converge.
Sidner’s (1983) local focusing model used an attentional representa-
tion level to mediate the grammar’s control of discourse inferences. For
each pronoun, there is an ordered list of potential referents determined
by local focusing rules, and the highest one that leads to a consistent
commonsense interpretation of the utterance is chosen. Common sense
has a veto power over grammar-based focusing in the ultimate inter-
pretation, but common sense is the last resort, contrary to Hobbs’s
approach. Carter (1987) implemented Sidner’s theory combined with
Wilks’s (1975) preferential semantics, and reported the success rate of
93% for resolving pronouns in a variety of stories — of which only 12%
relied on commonsense inferences.
Grammar’s role in the control of inferences was the original moti-
vation of the centering model (Joshi and Kuhn, 1979; Joshi and We-
instein, 1981). The proposal was to use the monadic tendency of dis-
course (i.e., tendency to be centrally about one thing at a time) to
control the amount of computation required in discourse interpreta-
tion. Grosz, Joshi, and Weinstein (1983) proposed a refinement of
Sidner’s model in terms of centering, and highlighted the crucial role of
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pronouns in linking an utterance to the discourse context. Subsequent
work on centering converged on an equally significant role of the main
clause SUBJECT9 (Kameyama, 1985, 1986; Grosz, Joshi, and Wein-
stein, 1986; Brennan, Friedman, and Pollard, 1987). Hudson D’Zurma
(1988) experimentally verified that speakers had a difficulty in inter-
preting a discourse where a centering prediction was in conflict with
commonsense plausibility, leading to a ‘garden path’ effect. An exam-
ple from her experiment is: “Dick had a jam session with Brad. He
played trumpet while Brad played bass. ??He plucked very quickly.”
Centering models the local attentional state management in an overall
discourse model proposed by Grosz and Sidner (1986).
These computational approaches to discourse have recognized the
non–truth–conditional effects on utterance interpretation coming from
the utterance’s surface structure (i.e., phonological, morphological, and
syntactic structures). Although this aspect of interpretation cannot be
neglected in a discourse processing model, its relevance to a logical
model of discourse semantics and pragmatics has remained unclear. It
is worth pointing out that discourse pragmatics in the above computa-
tional approaches as well as in philosophy (e.g., Lewis, 1979; Stalnaker,
1980) has generally assumed a dynamic architecture. Would there be
a potential fit with the dynamic semantic theories in linguistics (e.g.,
Kamp, 1981; Heim, 1982; Groenendijk and Stokhof, 1991) in a way
that forms a basis for an integrated logical model of discourse seman-
tics and pragmatics? In this paper, I propose a pronoun interpretation
model taking ideas from both computational and linguistic traditions,
and present it in such a way that it becomes tractable for logical im-
plementation.
5 Pronoun Interpretation Preferences:
Facts
Pronoun interpretation must be carried out in an often vast space of
possibilities, somehow controlling the inferences with default prefer-
ences coming from different aspects of the current context. Pronouns
such as he, she, it and they can refer to entities talked about in the
current discourse, present in the current indexical context, or simply
salient in the model of the world implicitly shared by the discourse
participants. Since the problem space is vast and complex, we need to
narrow it down to come to grips with interesting generalizations. I will
now limit our discussion to the interpretation of the anaphoric use of
9Grammatical functions will be in uppercase in order to avoid the ambiguity of
these words.
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unstressed male singular third person pronoun he or him in English.
5.1 Survey and the Results
In 1993, I conducted a survey of pronoun interpretation preferences
using the discourse examples shown in Table 1. These examples were
constructed to isolate the relevant dimensions of interest based on pre-
vious work (see section 5.2).
One set of examples, A–H, involves pronouns that occur in the sec-
ond of two–sentence discourses. They were presented to competent
(some nonnative) speakers of English in the A-F-C-H-E-D-B-G order,
avoiding sequential effects of two adjancent similar examples. The
speakers were instructed to read them with no special stresses on words,
and to answer the who-did-what questions about pronouns in italics.
The answer “unclear” was also allowed, in which case, the speaker was
encouraged to state the reason. The total number of the speakers was
47, of which 10 were nonlinguist natural language researchers and 4
were nonnative but fluent English speakers. The second set of exam-
ples, I–L, are longer discourses. They were given to disjoint sets of
native English speakers, none of whom are linguists.
The examples fall under two general categories, as indicated in Ta-
ble 1. One group isolates the grammatical effects by minimizing com-
monsense biases. In these examples, it is conjectured that there is no
relevant commonsense knowledge that affects the pronoun interpreta-
tion in question. The other group examines the commonsense effects
of a specific causal knowledge of hitting and injuring in relation to the
grammatical effects observed in the first group.
Table 2 shows the survey results. The χ2df=1 significance for each
example was computed by adding an evenly divided number of the “un-
clear” answers to each explicitly selected answer, reflecting the assump-
tion that an “unclear” answer shows a genuine ambiguity. Preference
is considered significant if p < .05, weakly significant if .05 < p < .10,
and insignificant if .10 < p. Insignificant preference is interpreted to
mean ambiguity or incoherence. It follows from the Gricean Maxim
that ambiguity must be avoided in order for an utterance to be prag-
matically felicitous. An example with an insignificant preference is thus
infelicitous, and should not be generated.
It must be noted that the present survey results exhibit only one
aspect of preferential interpretation — namely, the final preference
reached after an unlimited time to think. They do not represent the
process of interepretation — for instance, a number of speakers com-
mented that they had to retract the first obvious choice in example I.
This garden–path effect verified in Hudson D’Zurma’s (1988) experi-
ments does not show in the present survey results.
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Grammatical Effects:
A. John hit Bill. Mary told him to go home.
B. Bill was hit by John. Mary told him to go home.
C. John hit Bill. Mary hit him too.
D. John hit Bill. He doesn’t like him.
E. John hit Bill. He hit him back.
K. Babar went to a bakery. He greeted the baker.
He pointed at a blueberry pie.
L. Babar went to a bakery. The baker greeted him.
He pointed at a blueberry pie.
Commonsense Effects:
F. John hit Bill. He was severely injured.
G. John hit Arnold Schwarzenegger. He was severely injured.
H. John hit the Terminator. He was severely injured.
I. Tommy came into the classroom. He saw Billy at the door.
He hit him on the chin. He was severely injured.
J. Tommy came into the classroom. He saw a group of boys at the door.
He hit one of them on the chin. He was severely injured.
Table 1: Discourse Examples in the Survey
Answers χ2
df=1
p
A. John 42 Bill 0 Unclear 5 37.53 p < .001
B. John 7 Bill 33 Unclear 7 14.38 p < .001
C. John 0 Bill 47 Unclear 0 47 p < .001
D. J. dislikes B. 42 B. dislikes J. 0 Unclear 5 37.53 p < .001
E. John hit Bill 2 Bill hit John 45 Unclear 0 39.34 p < .001
K. Babar 13 Baker 0 Unclear 0 13 p < .001
L. Babar 3 Baker 10 Unclear 0 3.77 .05 < p < .10
F. John 0 Bill 46 Unclear 1 45.02 p < .001
G. John 24 Arnold 13 Unclear 10 2.57 .10 < p < .20
H. John 34 Terminator 6 Unclear 7 16.68 p < .001
I. Tommy 3 Billy 17 Unclear 1 9.33 .001 < p < .01
J. Tommy 10 Boy 7 Unclear 3 0.45 .50 < p < .70
Table 2: Survey Results
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5.2 Discussion of the Results
The present set of examples highlights four major sources of prefer-
ence in pronoun interpretation — SUBJECT Antecedent Preference,
Pronominal Chain Preference, Grammatical Parallelism Preference,
and Commonsense Preference. These are stated at a descriptive level
with no theoretical commitments. A theoretical account of the same
set of facts will be given in section 6. Each source of preference is
discussed below.
SUBJECT Antecedent Preference. A hierarchy of the pre-
ferred intersentential antecedent of a pronoun has been proposed in the
centering framework, which basically says that the main clause SUB-
JECT is preferred over the OBJECT (Kameyama, 1985,1986; Grosz et
al., 1986). This preference is confirmed in examples A and B.10
The consistency of this preference across examples A and B demon-
strates that grammatical functions rather than thematic roles are the
adequate level of generalization. In both A and B, the thematic roles
of Bill and John in the first sentence are agent and theme (or patient),
respectively, but the switch in grammatical functions by passivization
causes the preferred interpretation to switch accordingly.
Example C demonstrates the defeasibility of this preference in the
face of the parallelism induced by the adverb too as a side effect of an
indefeasible conventional presupposition (see section 6).
Pronominal Chain Preference. This is the preference for a chain
of pronouns across utterances to corefer.11 Examples K and L are a
minimal pair of structural effects without a commonsense bias. Their
contrast shows the effect of grammatical positions. The SUBJECT–
SUBJECT chain of pronouns (example K) supports a significant coref-
erence preference (p < .001), whereas the OBJECT-SUBJECT chain
(example L) supports a weakly significant noncoreference preference
(.05 < p < .10) indicating a parallelism effect below.
Example I shows that the causal knowledge also in the end overrides
a stretch of SUBJECT pronominal chain, but as noted above, this
example causes the speakers to first interpret the SUBJECT pronouns
10Some speakers indicated that they had to assume additional facts in order to
make a plausible scenario — for instance, in example A, “Mary is a teacher, and
she sent John home as a punishment”. The speakers seem to want some more
information to make the judgment more conclusive. What are the relationships
among these three people mentioned out of the blue? I realize that impoverished
examples of this sort rarely occur in our real–life discourses. To sort out some
rather delicate interplay of preferences, however, we need to start out with simplified
examples. This is analogous to the use of the “blocks world” (i.e., the world of
blocks) in AI.
11I will use the simple terminology of “referent” and “coreference” without com-
mitting to their realist connotation because this does not affect the points I wish to
make in this paper.
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to corefer, then retract the choice due to the inconsistency with a causal
knowledge. This processing tendency indicates that the grammatical
preference is processed faster than the commonsense preference. We
will come back to this issue later.
In example J, the strong preference for a SUBJECT pronominal
chain is undermined by the indefiniteness of the referent (one of the
boys) that the generic causal knowledge supports and by the additional
inference — when one hits one of a group of boys, he would be revenged
by the group. The grammar–based preference and common sense are
in a tie here, showing a genuine ambiguity (.50 < p < .70).
Grammatical Parallelism Preference. There is a general pref-
erence for two adjacent utterances to be grammatically parallel. The
parallelism requires, roughly, that the SUBJECTs of two adjacent ut-
terances corefer and that the OBJECTs, if applicable, also corefer. This
preference is demonstrated in example D that involves two pronouns.12
In example L, the parallelism preference overrides the pronominal chain
preference.
Example E shows the defeasibility of the parallelism preference in
the face of the presupposition triggered by adverb back. An “x hit
y back” event conventionally presupposes that a “y hit x” event has
previously occurred, leading to the near-unanimous interpretation “Bill
hit John back.”13
Commonsense Preference. Examples F–H illustrate the effect
of a simple causal knowledge that dictates the final interpretation over
and above the grammatical preferences. In example F, the SUBJECT
Antecedent Preference is defeated by an inference derived from the
generic causal knowledge — “when X hits Y, Y is normally hurt,”
and “being injured is being hurt.” Since the example involves some
“normal” fellows called John and Bill, it applies with full force (46/47).
Examples G and H show what happens to this baseline default when
the described event involves some special individuals (fictitious or non-
fictitious) that the speakers have some knowledge about. In example H,
the preferred interpretation (34/47) swings to the one where the normal
fellow, John, is injured as a result of attempting to assault the inde-
structible cyborg.14 The cyborg also could have been injured (6/47)
12Another possible source of preference is the causal link between the two de-
scribed eventualities, John’s hitting Bill (e1) and someone disliking someone (e2).
The preferred interpretation supports the causal link “e1 because e2”, while the
alternative interpretation, which nobody took, supports “e1 therefore e2”. These
could be stated in terms of discourse relations of Explanation and Cause (e.g., Las-
carides and Asher, 1993). I’m not aware of any empirical studies of this kind of
preference effects.
13I suspect that the two speakers who took the opposite interpretation used the
sense of back close to “again”.
14The Terminator is a cyborg played by Arnold Schwarzenegger in a popular
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(because the movie showed that it can be destroyed after all). In exam-
ple G, John attempts to assault a warm–blooded real person, Arnold,
who seems a little stronger than normal fellows. Here, more speakers
thought that John was injured (24/47) than Arnold was (13/47), but
this preference is insignificant (.10 < p < .20). It reflects the indeter-
minacy of whether Arnold is a normal fellow or not, which affects the
applicability of the generic causal knowledge.15
5.3 Descriptive Generalizations
Table 3 summarizes the preference predicted by each of the four sources
discussed above and the final outcome verified in the survey. We see
the following general patterns of conflict resolution:
1. Conventional Presuppositions (triggered by adverbs in examples
C and E) and Commonsense Preferences (examples F, G, and H)
dictate the final preference.
2. Grammatical Preferences take charge in the absence of relevant
Commonsense Preferences (examples A–E, K, and L).
3. The SUBJECT Antecedent Preference overrides the Grammati-
cal Parallelism Preference when in conflict (see examples A and
B), and both are in turn stronger than the Pronominal Chain
Preference (example L).
The cases of indeterminate final preference in examples G and J are
worth noting. This kind of an indeterminate preference is infelicitous
and uncooperative, which should be avoided in discourse generation.
The indeterminacy in example G is due to the indeterminacy of Arnold
being a normal person subject to injury or an abnormally strong person
who would not let himself be injured. The indeterminacy in example
J is due to the conflict between the general causal knowledge about an
injury caused by hitting and the insalience of an indefinite referent as
a possible pronominal referent.
6 Pronoun Interpretation Preferences:
Account
Four major sources of preference have been identified in the above pro-
noun interpretation examples. I propose that these sources correspond
science–fiction movie.
15Of interest here is the fact that the three speakers who knew nothing about
what a “Terminator” is all interpreted that John was injured in example H. They
clearly sensed “something nasty and abnormal” from this name alone.
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Subj.Pref. Pron.Chain Parallel. Com.Sense Outcome
A. John — Bill unclear John
B. Bill — John unclear Bill
C. John — Bill unclear Bill♣
D. John–Bill? — John–Bill unclear John–Bill
E. John–Bill? — John–Bill unclear Bill–John♦
K. Babar Babar Babar unclear Babar
L. Baker Babar Baker unclear Baker
F. John — John Bill Bill
G. John — John John/Arnold John/Arnold
H. John — John John John
I. Tommy Tommy Tommy Billy Billy♠
J. Tommy Tommy Tommy Boy Tommy/Boy
♣ — due to the conventional presupposition triggered by adverb too.
♦ — due to the conventional presupposition triggered by adverb back.
♠ — Tommy is the first choice, which is later retracted.
Table 3: Preference Interactions: Facts
to the data structures in the different context components outlined in
section 2.3. The context components the most relevant to the present
discussion are the attentional state A, the LF register φ, and the dis-
course model D.
The main thrust of the present account is the general interaction
of preferences that apply on different context components. It explains
the basic fact that preferences may or may not be determinate. The
present perspective of preference interactions also extends and explains
the role of the attentional state in Grosz and Sidner’s (1986) discourse
theory.
6.1 The Role of the Attentional State
A discourse describes situations, eventualities, and entities, together
with the relations among them. The attentional state A represents a
dynamically updated snapshot of their salience. We thus assume the
property salient to be a primitive representing the partial order among
a set of entities in A.16 The property salient is gradient and relative. A
certain absolute degree of salience may not be achieved by any entities
in a given A, but there is always a set of maximally salient entities,
which is often, but not necessarily, a singleton set.17 Thus it is crucial
that a rule about the single maximally salient entity in a given A is
only sometimes determinate.
16I will not discuss the partial order of propositions.
17Those entities that are “inaccessible” in the DRT sense do not participate in
the salience ordering, or even if they do, they are below a certain minimal threshold
of salience.
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We will now recast some elements of the centering model in the
present discourse processing architecture. In the input context Ci−1
for utterance utti, the form and content (φi−1) of the immediately
preceding utterance utti−1 occupy an especially salient status. The
entities realized in utti−1 are among the most salient subpart of Ai−1.
I assume that this is achieved by a general A-updating mechanism.
One of the entities in Ai−1 may be the Centeri−1, what the current
discourse is centrally about, hence the high salience:18
CENTER The Center is normally more salient than other entities in
the same attentional state.
At least two default linguistic hierarchies are relevant to the dy-
namics of salience.19 One is the grammatical function hierarchy (GF
ORDER), and the other is the nominal expression type hierarchy (EXP
ORDER). The GF ORDER in utti predicts the relative salience of en-
tities in the output attentional state Ai whereas the EXP ORDER in
utti predicts the relative salience of entities assumed in the input atten-
tional state Ai−1.
20 EXP ORDER is also crucial to the management
of the Center (EXP CENTER):
GF ORDER: Given a hierarchy, [SUBJECT > OBJECT > OB-
JECT2 > Others], an entity realized by a higher ranked phrase
is normally more salient in the output attentional state.
EXP ORDER: Given a hierarchy, [Zero Pronominal > Pronoun
> Definite NP > Indefinite NP],21 an entity realized by a
higher–ranked expression type is normally more salient in the
input attentional state.
EXP CENTER: An expression of the highest ranked type normally
realizes the Center in the output attentional state.
EXP CENTER can be interpreted in two ways. One computes
the “highest–ranked type” per utterance, sometimes allowing a non-
pronominal expression type to output the Center. The other takes it
to be fixed, namely, only the pronominals. The choice is empirical. In
this paper, I will take the second interpretation.
18In the centering model, the entities realized in φi−1 are the “forward–looking
centers” (Cf), and Centeri−1 is the “backward–looking center” (Cb).
19Consituents’ linear ordering and animacy are also relevant.
20This order also approximates the relative salience of entities in the output at-
tentional state, as demonstrated in part in example J.
21There is a pragmatic difference between stressed and unstressed pronouns,
which should be accounted for by an independent treatment of stress — for ex-
ample, in terms of a preference reversal function (Kameyama, 1994b). This paper
concerns only unstressed pronouns.
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Since matrix subjects and objects cannot be omitted in English,22
the highest–ranked expression type is the (unstressed) pronoun (see
Kameyama, 1985:Ch.1). From EXP ORDER, it follows that a pronoun
normally realizes a maximally salient entity in the input attentional
state. A pronoun can also realize a submaximally salient entity if this
choice is supported by another overriding preference. The grammatical
features of pronouns also constrain the range of possible referents —
for instance, a he–type entity is a male agent. The maximal salience
thus applies on the suitably restricted subset of the domain for each
type of pronoun.
The interactions of the above defeasible rules — CENTER, GF
ORDER, EXP ORDER, and EXP CENTER — account for various
descriptive generalizations. First, the SUBJECT Antecedent Prefer-
ence follows from GF ORDER and EXP ORDER — SUBJECT is the
highest ranked GF in the first utterance, and a pronoun in the second
utterance realizes the maximally salient entity in the input A. Second,
the coreference and noncoreference preferences in pronominal chains
are accounted for. The strong coreference preference for a SUBJECT–
SUBJECT pronominal chain (example K) comes from the fact that a
SUBJECT Center is the single maximally salient entity, which leads to
a determinate preference. In contrast, an OBJECT Center competes
with the SUBJECT non–Center for the maximal salience, which leads
to an indeterminate preference based on salience alone (example L).
The indeterminacy is resolved, to some extent, by the Grammatical
Parallelism Preference (section 6.2).23
The center transition types of “establishing” and “chaining”
(Kameyama, 1985,1986) result from the interactions of CENTER, EXP
ORDER, and EXP CENTER.24 The Center is “established” when a
pronoun picks a salient non–Center in the input context and makes it
the Center in the output context. It is “chained” when a pronoun picks
the Center in the input context and makes it the Center in the output
context. Examples A–H are thus concerned with Center–establishing
pronouns, whereas examples I–L are concerned with Center–chaining
pronouns. These transition types are not the primitives that directly
drive preferences, however.
22Except in a telegraphic register.
23This notion of the single maximally salient entity corresponds to the “preferred
center” Cp (Grosz et al., 1986) that is determined solely by the GF ORDER. The
difference here is that it is determined by both the Center and GF ORDER, pre-
dicting an indeterminacy in certain cases.
24What I have previously called retain is now called chain. It covers both CON-
TINUE and RETAIN technically distinguished by Grosz et al. (1986) and Brennan
et al. (1987).
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6.2 The Role of the LF Register
The grammatical parallelism of two adjacent utterances in discourse af-
fects the preferred interpretation of pronouns (Kameyama, 1986), tense
(Kameyama, Passonneau, and Poesio, 1993), and ellipsis (Pruest, 1992;
Kehler, 1993). This general tendency warrants a separate statement.
Parallelism is achieved, in the present account, by a computation on
the pair of logical forms, one in the LF register in the context, and the
other being interpreted.
PARA: The LF register in the input context and the ILF being inter-
preted seek maximal parallelism.25
The present perspective of rule interaction explains the “property–
sharing” constraint on Center–chaining (Kameyama, 1986) as follows.
GF ORDER, EXP ORDER, and PARA join forces to create a strong
grammatical preference for SUBJECT–SUBJECT coreference (exam-
ples D,K). When they are in conflict, that is, when the maximally
salient entity is not in a parallel position, PARA is defeated (exam-
ples A,B). When maximal salience is indeterminate, the parallelism
preference affects the choice (example L), leading to a noncoreference
preference for an OBJECT–SUBJECT pronominal chain.
6.3 The Role of the Discourse Model
The discourse model contains a set of information states about sit-
uations, eventualities, entities, and the relations among them. It also
contains the evolving discourse structure, temporal structure, and event
structure. Both linguistic semantics and commonsense preferences ap-
ply on the same discourse model.
Lexically Triggered Presuppositions. Adverbs too and back
trigger conventional presuppositionsabout the input discourse model.
These presuppositions are part of lexical semantics, thus indefeasible.
Adverb too triggers a presupposition that appears to seek paral-
lelism between an utterance in the context and the utterance being
interpreted. This is actually due to a general similarity presupposition
associated with too. Consider each of the following utterances immedi-
ately preceding “John hit Bill too”: “Mary hit Bill”, “John hit Mary”,
“Mary kicked Bill”, “John kicked Mary”, “Mary hit Jane”, and ?“John
called Bill”. What’s construed as ‘similar’ in each case is a function
of the particular utterance pair, and intuitively, preferred pairs sup-
25This statement is intentionally left vague. See Pruest’s (1992) MSCD operation
for a general definition of parallelism preference, and my property–sharing constraint
(Kameyama, 1986) for a subcase relevant to pronoun interpretation.
20
port more similarities. Thus similarity comes in degrees, and a parallel
interpretation is due to the preference for a maximal similarity.
Adverb back triggers a presupposition for a reverse parallelism.
That is, the utterance “Bill hit John back” presupposes that it oc-
curred after “John hit Bill”.
Commonsense Knowledge. In contrast to the above rules that
belong to the linguistic knowledge, the commonsense knowledge con-
sists of all that an ordinary speaker knows about the world and life.
Formalizing common sense is a major research goal of AI, where non-
monotonic reasoning has been intensively studied. My goal here is
not to propose a new approach to commonsense reasoning but sim-
ply to highlight its interaction with linguistic pragmatics in the overall
pragmatics subsystem. We know one thing for sure — there will be
a relatively small number of linguistic pragmatic rules that systemat-
ically interact with an open–ended mass of commonsense rules. Since
the linguistic rules can be seen to control commonsense inferences, our
aim is to describe the former as fully as possible, and specify how the
“control mechanism” works. The commonsense rules posited in con-
nection to the examples in this paper are thus meant to be exemplary.
There will be different rules for each new example and domain to be
treated. The linguistic rules, however, should be stable across examples
and domains.
The single powerful causal knowledge at work in our examples is
that hitting may cause injury on the hittee but less likely on the hitter:
HIT: When an agent x hits an agent y, y is normally hurt.
The effects of the Terminator and Arnold indicate that the applicabil-
ity of the HIT rule depends on the normality of the agents involved.
Relevant knowledge includes things like: An agent is normally vulner-
able, Arnold is a normal agent or an abnormally strong agent, and
Terminator is an abnormally strong agent.
6.4 Account of the Rule Interactions
We now state the preference interaction patterns observed in Table 3
above. The SUBJECT Antecedent Preference and Pronominal Chain
Preference result from CENTER, GF ORDER, EXP ORDER, and
EXP CENTER. These are the defeasible Attentional Rules (ATT) stat-
ing the preferred attentional state transitions. The Grammatical Par-
allelism Preference is PARA. This is an example of the defeasible LF
Rules (LF) stating the preferred LF transitions. Conventional presup-
positions triggered by too and back are examples of the indefeasible
Semantic Rules (SEM) in the grammar constraining the interpretation
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ATT LF WK SEM Winner
A. John Bill unclear — ATT
B. Bill John unclear — ATT
C. John Bill unclear Bill SEM
D. John–Bill? John–Bill unclear — LF
E. John–Bill? John–Bill unclear Bill–John SEM
K. Babar Babar unclear — ATT+LF
L. Baker/Babar Baker unclear — ATT+LF
F. John John Bill — WK
G. John John John/Arnold — WK
H. John John John — WK
I. Tommy Tommy Billy — WK (with difficulty)
J. Tommy Tommy Boy(/Tommy) — ??
Rules: ATT={CENTER, GF ORDER, EXP ORDER, EXP CENTER},
LF={PARA}, WK={HIT, ETC}, SEM={TOO, BACK}.
Table 4: Preference Interactions: Account
in the discourse model. The causal knowledge of hitting is HIT, with as-
sociated knowledge ETC about agents, Terminator, and Arnold. These
are examples of the defeasible Commonsense Rules (WK) stating the
preferred discourse model. Table 4 identifies the rules that dominate
the final interpretation in examples A–L.
General Features. The first distinction among these rules is de-
feasibility. The SEM rules are indefeasible whereas all other rules are
defeasible. It is predicted that indefeasible rules override all defeasible
rules, as verified in examples C and E.
What factor determines the interaction pattern among the defeasi-
ble rules? The three context components — discourse model D, atten-
tional state A, and LF register φ— all have their preferred transitions.
The D preference results from proposition–level (or “sentence–level”)
inferences directly determining the preferred model whereas the A and
LF preferences result from entity–level (or “term–level”) inferences
only indirectly determining the preferred model. We have seen that
proposition–level preferences, if applicable, generally override entity–
level preferences, albeit with a varying degree of difficulty.
Take two examples: (1) “John met Bill. He was injured.” and (2)
“John hit Bill. He was injured.” In (1), the ATT and LF preference
that the pronoun refers to John indirectly leads to the preference that
John was injured, which becomes the overall preference in the absence
of relevant WK rules. In (2), relevant WK rules directly support a
proposition–level preference, Bill was injured, which wins out (with a
varying degree of difficulty). These “flows of preference” during an
utterance interpretation are illustrated below:
(1) [S [NP he]:{John>Bill} was injured] =⇒ John was injured
22
(2) [S [NP he]:{John>Bill} was injured]:{Bill was injured > John was
injured} =⇒ Bill was injured.
Conflict Resolution Patterns. We see a straightforward over-
riding pattern in examples A–H involving “Center–establishing” pro-
nouns: ATT overrides LF , and WK overrides ATT and LF . Such
an overriding relation can be seen as a dynamic updating operation (;)
(van Benthem et al., 1993) — preferences are evaluated in turn, the
later ones overriding the earlier ones: LF ;ATT ;WK.26 It may be the
general pattern of “changing preferences” during utterance interpreta-
tion.
Examples I–L involving “Center–chaining” pronouns show more
or less the same pattern except that the overriding gets more diffi-
cult in some cases. It is more difficult when a SUBJECT pronoun
chain supports a single maximally salient entity as in example I. This
shows that the LF and ATT preferences in fact join forces to interact
with the WK preferences. This intuition is expressed with brackets:
[LF ;ATT ];WK. The “retraction” observed in example I still fits this
pattern, but the increased difficulty in overriding is only implicit.
Lascarides and Asher (1993) illustrate patterns of defeasible rule
interactions. The two inference patterns most relevant here are the
Nixon Diamond and the Penguin Principle defined below (φ→ ψ means
“if φ, then indefeasibly ψ,” and φ > ψ means “if φ, then normally
ψ.”):27
Nixon Diamond A conflict is unresolved resulting in an ambiguity
or incoherence: (φ > χ) ∧ (ψ > ¬χ) ⊃ (φ, ψ > χ ∧ ¬χ).
Penguin Principle A conflict is resolved by the more specific princi-
ple defeating the more general one:28
(φ→ ψ) ∧ (φ > χ) ∧ (ψ > ¬χ) ⊃ (φ, ψ > χ).
On their account, any resolution of a conflict between two defeasible
rules should be a case of the Penguin Principle. Does it explain all the
conflict resolution patterns observed in pronoun interpretation?
The Penguin Principle explains some of the conflict resolution pat-
terns — for instance, the knowledge about specific agents, Terminator
and Arnold, override the generic causal knowledge about hitting (ex-
amples G and H). There may also be a remote conceptual connection
between the Penguin Principle and the pattern [LF ;ATT ];WK in the
26φ;ψ[X] means ψ[φ[X]], where p[X] means X ∩ [[p]] (update state X with p).
27In these definitions, I use the notations from Asher and Morreau’s (1993) Com-
monsense Entailment (CE) logic as a theoretical meta–formalism without strictly
adhering to the CE ontology.
28It follows from Cautious Monotonicity [A⇒B, A⇒C / A,B⇒C]:
(φ→ ψ) ∧ (φ > χ) ⊃ (φ, ψ > χ) because (φ ∧ ψ)↔ φ.
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following line — grammatical preferences (ATT and LF) tend to be
more abstract than commonsense preferences (WK) about particular
types of eventualities, so the more specific support wins (Kameyama
et al., 1993). However, the LF, ATT, and WK rules apply on different
data structures, and cannot always be reduced to an indefeasible im-
plication (φ → ψ) as required in the Penguin Principle. For instance,
hittee(x) can be subject(x) or ¬subject(x) depending on the sentence
structure, so we cannot say that hittee(x) implies ¬subject(x) to derive
the overriding pattern in example F. What additional kinds of conflict
resolution inferences do we have then?
There are two additional conflict resolution patterns observed in the
present examples, which I will call the Indefeasible Override and the
Defeasible Override, defined below:
Indefeasible Override An indefeasible principle overrides a defeasi-
ble one: (φ→ χ) ∧ (ψ > ¬χ) ⊃ (φ, ψ → χ).
Defeasible Override Given an explicit overriding relation, one de-
feasible principle defeats another (even when ψ > ¬χ):
(ψ;φ) ∧ (φ > χ) ⊃ (φ, ψ > χ).
The Indefeasible Override follows from the monotonicity of classical
implication (φ → χ ⊃ φ, ψ → χ), and is an inherent principle in any
nonmonotonic logic. It predicts the fact that the SEM rules override
all the defeasible rules (examples C and E). The Defeasible Override
captures a certain a priori given “ranks” or “priorities” among different
sources of information, using the dynamic override (;) operator, where
φ;ψ means “ψ overrides φ.” It is motivated by the view that preferences
come from different sources, and are associated with different “degrees
of defeasibility” not necessarily in terms of the Penguin Principle.29 It
enables us to state the override pattern [LF ;ATT ];WK while allowing
a varying degree of difficulty for WK’s overriding. I hope to define a
logical system that axiomatizes these conflict resolution inferences.
7 Further Questions
A number of questions related to the present topic have not been dis-
cussed. The first are logical questions. What are the connections with
update logics (e.g., Veltman, 1993)? We can see that the grammar
subsystem supports straight updating, whereas the pragmatics subsys-
tem supports preferential updating or upgrading (van Benthem et al.,
1993). The preference interaction patterns discussed here can perhaps
29Ga¨rdenfors and Makinson’s (1994) use of expectation ordering in preferential
reasonning achieves essentially the same effect.
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be formulated as fine–grained upgrading inferences during utterance
interpretation within the proposed utterance interpretation architec-
ture. Can my proposal be couched in a system of preferential dynamic
logic that combines elements of dynamic semantic theories and prefer-
ential models (e.g., McCarthy, 1980; Shoham, 1988)? Does the context
as a multicomponent data structure proposed here also support the
general contextual inferences such as lifting in the context logic (e.g.,
McCarthy, 1993; Buvacˇ and Mason, 1993)?
There are also computational questions. Does the proposed dis-
course processing architecture with explicit contextual control of infer-
ences actually help manage the computational complexity of the non-
monotonic reasoning in the pragmatic rule interactions?
Finally, a cognitive question — Does the proposed discourse pro-
cessing architecture naturally extend to a more elaborate many–person
discourse model that addresses the issue of coordinating different pri-
vate contexts (e.g., Perrault, 1990; Thomason, 1990; Jaspars, 1994)?
8 Conclusions
A discourse processing architecture with desirable computational prop-
erties consists of a grammar subsystem representing the space of pos-
sibilities and a pragmatics subsystem representing the space of prefer-
ences. Underspecified logical forms proposed in the computational liter-
ature define the grammar–pragmatics boundary. Utterance interpreta-
tion induces a complex interaction of defeasible rules in the pragmatics
subsystem. Upon scrutiny of a set of examples involving intersenten-
tial pronominal anaphora, I have identified different groups of defeasible
rules that determine the preferred transitions of different components of
the dynamic context. There are grammatical preferences inducing fast
entity–level inferences only indirectly suggesting the preferred discourse
model, and commonsense preferences inducing slow proposition–level
inferences directly determining the preferred discourse model. The at-
tentional state in the context supports the formulation of attentional
rules that significantly affect pronoun interpretation preferences. The
observed patterns of conflict resolution among interacting preferences
are predicted by a small set of inference patterns including the one
that assumes an explicitly given overriding relation between rules or
rule groups. In general, I hope that this paper has made clear some
of the actual complexities of interacting preferences in linguistic prag-
matics, and that the discussion has made them sufficiently sorted out
for further logical implementations.30
30In the longer version of this paper (Kameyama, 1994a), a logical implementation
of the preferential rule interactions is proposed using prioritized circumscription
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